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1.  Introduction 
Observing movements to lower capital taxes and higher labor taxes in the EU, the European 
Commission stated that EU tax policies should aim to reverse these trends (European Commission, 
1996). In 1997, the European Union launched the so-called ‘tax package’ of initiatives in the area of 
capital income taxation to bring about higher capital income taxation in the EU. As part of this 
package, the EU was to identify and roll back so-called harmful tax practices in the area of corporate 
income taxation.1 There similarly was a call for cooperation in the area of savings taxation, which 
led to an agreement on the exchange of information on international interest flows in 2003. The ‘tax 
package’ is the latest in a series of attempts to coordinate either corporate income taxes or the 
taxation of savings in the EU. To wit, the European Commission proposed a minimum withholding 
tax on interest of 15 percent in 1989, to be superceded by a proposal where countries could choose 
between a minimum withholding tax of 20 percent on international interest payments and 
exchanging information regarding these payments (European Commission, 1998). In 1975, there 
was a proposal to contain corporate tax rates within the 45-55 percent bracket. The Ruding 
committee (European Commission, 1992) instead recommended a band of 30 to 40 percent for 
corporate tax rates. 
Like the ‘tax package’, these previous attempts always were partial in that they only 
pertained to capital income taxes. Labor taxes, specifically, have never been included in tax 
coordination proposals (beyond cooperation related to frontier workers). The expectation and 
indeed the intention, however, is that higher coordinated capital income taxes in the EU lead to 
lower taxes on labor. 
Table 1 summarizes recent trends in capital and labor income taxation in the EU15 since 
1995.2 As seen in Panel A, capital income taxes have risen from 7.7 percent of GDP in 1995 to 9.2 
percent in 2000, to fall back to 8.3 percent of GDP in 2002. Labor income taxes instead have 
declined from 21.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to 20.7 percent of GDP in 2001, while consumption 
taxes have varied little from the level of 11.5 percent in 1995.  Correspondingly, Panel B of the 
figure shows that capital income taxes have risen from 19.0 percent of total taxes in 1995 to 22.0 
percent in 2000 to decline slightly to 20.6 percent in 2002. The share of labor taxes instead has 
declined over this period from 52.7 percent in 1995 to 50.9 percent in 2002, against a fairly stable 
share of consumption taxes in the overall tax mix. An increased share of capital income taxes in 
total taxes may to some extent reflect actual or anticipated tax policy coordination at EU level, in 
addition to the business cycle (an expanding EU economy till 2000) or perhaps increasing foreign 
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ownership (which could lead countries to try to export their capital income taxes; see Huizinga 
and Nielsen (1997)).  
Regardless of recent trends, EU capital income tax policy coordination potentially can  
shift the overall tax mix towards higher capital income taxes and lower labor income taxes. 
Following the contributions by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)) and Wilson (1986) to the tax 
competition literature, higher capital income taxes – beyond their uncoordinated levels – should 
yield higher welfare. This reflects that higher capital income taxes create positive externalities 
abroad – in the form of higher capital employment – that countries ignore, if they set capital 
income taxes in an uncoordinated fashion. The resulting higher tax revenues increase the supply of 
public goods, and hence they reduce the need to raise revenues by way of labor income taxes. 
Policy coordination towards higher capital income taxes thus is expected to bring about lower 
labor income taxes.  
Lower labor taxes induced by higher capital taxes, however, are welfare reducing per se, 
as labor taxes in the uncoordinated tax competition equilibrium are equally set too low. This 
suggests that the overall welfare implications of partial capital income tax coordination – bringing 
about higher capital income taxes and lower labor income taxes - are ambiguous. The net welfare 
effect of capital tax coordination, in fact, can be expected to reflect i) the relative merit of capital 
and labor income taxation at the margin from an international or system perspective and on ii) the 
downward responsiveness of labor taxes following the coordinated increase in capital taxes. If a 
reduction in labor income taxes is especially undesirable from an international perspective 
(relative to a capital income tax decrease), and if the downward response in labor taxes following 
a coordinated increase in capital income taxes is strong, then a deterioration of welfare cannot be 
ruled out. The possibility of welfare reducing partial capital tax coordination arises from the fact 
that both no and partial tax coordination are second best outcomes. A priori it is not clear which of 
these suboptimal outcomes produces higher welfare.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it presents a simple two-country model with 
mobile labor and capital that enables us to analyze the welfare consequences of capital income tax 
coordination theoretically.  For special cases of this model, we can explicitly derive how the 
welfare consequences of partial capital tax coordination depend on underlying factor demand and 
supply elasticities and on the strength of the demand for public goods. Secondly, the paper 
presents the results of simulations with a slightly more complicated two-period, two-country 
model - calibrated to EU public finance figures - to arrive at an informed estimate of the welfare 
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consequences of partial tax coordination in practice. 
In a tax competition game, countries maximize their national welfares by equating the 
excess burdens from a national perspective of raising additional revenue through either capital or 
labor taxes. A basic insight is that this does not imply that the excess burdens created by the two 
factor taxes are equalized from an international perspective. Moreover, the fact that capital 
income taxes are relatively low does not imply that a tax mix shift towards higher capital taxes – 
induced by capital tax coordination – is necessarily welfare improving. To see this, we can, for 
example, assume that the supply of capital through savings is relatively elastic. This gives rise to 
relatively low taxes on capital in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium. The high sensitivity of 
savings supply, however, precisely makes the capital income tax a bad tax to increase through 
coordination. In the worst case scenario for capital tax coordination, labor supply would be 
completely inelastic at the national level, even if each country’s labor employment is sensitive to 
taxation on account of the international mobility of labor. A shift towards higher capital income 
taxes and lower labor income taxes – induced by the higher capital income taxes – would then be 
in the wrong direction. It would be wiser to coordinate towards higher labor taxes instead, even if 
they initially already are relatively high. The theoretical model serves to demonstrate how the 
relative merits of coordinated increases of capital and labor taxes generally depend on factor 
demand and supply elasticities as well as on the flexibility of the demand for public goods to be 
financed with tax revenues. 
With the aid of the simulation model, we examine a joint increase in the capital income 
tax from the uncoordinated Nash level. For fixed levels of labor income taxes, capital income tax 
coordination of this kind raises spending on public goods as well as welfare, confirming that 
capital income taxes in the Nash outcome are too low. Next, we let countries adjust their labor 
income taxes to the higher levels of capital income taxes and public goods. For our base-line 
simulation, countries adjust their labor income downward from the Nash level. This secondary 
adjustment reduces public goods and welfare levels. However, in all our simulations the overall 
welfare effect of partial capital income tax coordination remains positive. This reflects that the 
overall impact on tax revenues is positive and, not least, that the revealed excess burdens of 
capital and labor taxation in the Nash equilibrium are rather similar.  
Several authors have considered tax policy coordination in a partial or second-best setting 
before. Fuest and Huber (1999) examine partial tax coordination in a setting where several tax 
instruments can be used to affect the effective rate of taxation of capital income – these are the 
corporate tax rate, depreciation allowances, a withholding tax on interest and an origin-based 
VAT. In this setting, partial tax coordination related to only one or a few of these instruments has 
no real effects, if countries continue to have the disposal of other instruments with which they can 
offset changes in the coordinated instruments. Marchand, Pestieau and Sato (2003) investigate the 
welfare consequences of partial tax coordination in a model where the only purpose of fiscal 
policy is income redistribution. Partial tax coordination in the sense of involving only some 
countries is considered by Konrad and Schjelderup (1998) and also by Sørensen (2000) whose 
simulation results suggest that the welfare gains of regional capital coordination in the EU are 
relatively small compared to the gains to be realized by global capital tax coordination.3 Sørensen 
(2000) finds that capital income tax coordination raises an egalitarian social welfare function 
partly because of lower labor income taxes. Mendoza and Tesar (2005) have analyzed 
international capital tax coordination in a model calibrated to European data for the case where 
labor taxes are adjusted to maintain revenue neutrality. In their benchmark two-country model, 
capital tax coordination leads to higher capital taxes and lower labor taxes, with a rather small 
welfare gain of 0.26 percent in terms of a compensating variation in lifetime consumption.4  
It should also be mentioned that partial policy coordination in other areas than taxation has 
been investigated. For instance, Rogoff (1985) and Ploeg (1988) have considered partial 
macroeconomic policy coordination, while Gatsios and Karp (1992) have analyzed the partial 
coordination of international trade policies. In all of these settings, policy coordination is potentially 
welfare reducing. 
In the remainder, section 2 presents the theoretical analysis of the welfare consequences 
of partial tax coordination. Section 3 contains the simulation results, and section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The  model 
This section presents a simple stylized model with a view to analyzing the welfare 
consequences of capital income tax coordination theoretically. There are a domestic and a foreign 
country that are fully symmetric, with stars denoting foreign variables. The two variable factors of 
production are called capital and labor. The supplies of the two factors of production originating 
from the domestic country are denoted K  and M .5 These two factor supplies generate disutilities 
)(KD  and )(ME  respectively, with marginal disutilities increasing in factor supplies. The two 
factors are internationally mobile. This implies that domestic capital and labor employments, 
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denoted K and M, can be different from domestic capital and labor supplies, K  and M . Private 
utility in addition depends on a private consumption good, C, and a public consumption good, G. 
Welfare of the domestic representative agent, W, is for simplicity taken to be additively separable 
and linear in private consumption. It is represented as follows 
 
W = C + V(G) - D( K ) - E( M ) (1) 
 
with  .0'',0' ≤> VV
The private good, C, and the public good, G, are both produced with the same technology 
embodied in the production function f(K,M). The production function f displays decreasing returns 
to scale regarding the two variable inputs and decreasing marginal returns, while in addition we 
assume  fkm 0≥  ,  The net-of-tax return to capital and the wage are denoted 
r and w, respectively. The public good is financed through taxes on the employment of capital and 
labor.
.0 > ) f ( - f  f 2m km mk k
6 We will use τi, i = k,m, to denote the domestic tax on the employment of factor i.7 The 
budget constraints of the domestic private agent and the domestic government are represented as 
follows: 
 
              M w+ K r +  M)  + (w - K ) + (r -  M)f(K, = C mk ττ  (2) 
 
 G = τkK + τmM (3) 
 
 International factor market clearing requires that the world demand for either factor of 
production equals the world supply. This gives rise to two clearing conditions for the world capital 
and labor markets given by K + K =  K + K
**  and M + M = M + M
** , respectively.8 The capital 
and labor supplies of the domestic agent are governed by familiar optimality conditions that 
equate marginal disutilities to net factor rewards given by Dk = r and Em = w. The government 
chooses the rates, τk and τm, and the volume of public goods, G, to maximize private overall 
welfare as represented by the following Lagrangean: 
 
L = C - ) M ( E - ) K ( D  + V(G) + λ(τkK + τm M - G) (4) 
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 The first order conditions with respect to the policy variables τk,, τm and G are as follows 
 
0 =  
K
M  -   - 1  + 1- mn mknk ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τετελ ˆ  (5) 
 
0 =  
M
K  -   - 1  + 1- kn kmnm ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ τετελ ˆ  (6) 
 
V´ - λ = 0 (7) 
 
where τετε m
n 
m
k
n
k d
dM 
M
1 - =  ,
d
dK 
K
1 - =  and τετε k
n 
m
m
n
k d
dM 
M
1 - =  ,
d
dK 
K
1 - = ˆˆ  are the own and the cross 
factor employment semi-elasticities evaluated in the two-country non-cooperative equilibrium 
with factor mobility. These factor elasticities reflect that a change in a tax rate in a country 
triggers a relocation of the mobile factors of production so as to equate the net factor rewards, w 
and r, in the two countries. These factor employment elasticities are distinct from the ‘regular’ 
own and cross factor demand semi-elasticities given by  
dw
dM 
M
1 - =  ,
dr
dK 
K
1 - = dmdk εε dw
dK 
K
1 - = dkεˆ  
and 
dr
dM 
M
1 - =  d mεˆ . For special cases of the model considered below, we will relate the factor 
employment elasticities (   and ) to the factor demand elasticities (   and 
) and to the factor supply elasticities given by 
εε n mnk   , , εˆ nk   n mεˆ εε d mdk   , , εˆ dk
  dmεˆ  dw
Md 
M
1 =  
dr
Kd 
K
1 = smsk εε  and .9 Note that the 
government’s first-order conditions (5)-(7) can be solved for the optimal values of the capital and 
labor tax rates in the symmetric, non-cooperative tax equilibrium to yield 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∆′
′ εετ ˆ n mnmk  K
M -  1 
V
1 - V =  and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∆′
′ εετ ˆ n knkm  M
K -  1 
V
1 - V =  with .εεεε ˆˆ n mn knmnk   -   = ∆ 10
 
2.1 The welfare implications of capital tax coordination 
 We consider stylized partial tax coordination in the form of an increase in the capital tax 
in both countries starting from the non-cooperative overall tax equilibrium. The change in the 
common capital tax causes both countries to adjust their labor taxes until a new non-cooperative 
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equilibrium in these taxes is reached.  In the new equilibrium, there are again fully symmetric 
labor tax policies in the two countries. The overall welfare implications of the changed tax 
structure depend on the combined effects of the initial capital tax increase and the induced 
changes in labor taxes. As seen below, the cooperative increase in capital taxes is expected to lead 
to a reduction in non-cooperative labor taxes. The welfare implications of the overall change in 
the tax structure then depend on the relative merits of marginal changes in capital and labor taxes 
and on the strength of the response of labor taxes to the coordination of capital taxes. 
 To understand what drives the overall welfare effect, it is useful to consider two 
simplified versions of the theoretical model in turn. In the first version we shall assume that 
capital and labor supplies are elastic, but that the two factor demands are independent of each 
other as fkm =0. This allows us to develop some insight into the roles of factor demand and supply 
elasticities and of the implicit demand for public goods in determining the sign of the overall 
welfare implications.  
 In the second version of the model, we shall assume that capital and labor are in fixed 
supplies, but that factor demands are interdependent as fkm >0. This second case serves to bring 
out how the size of fkm can affect the welfare implications. The intuition developed in these two 
cases should continue to hold in the general theoretical model as well as in the simulation model 
considered in section 3.   
 
2.2 The case of variable factor supplies and independent factor demands 
Following higher coordinated capital taxes, the adjustment in non-cooperative labor taxes 
can conceptually be divided into two parts. First, each country can be thought to adjust its own 
labor tax in response to the jointly increased capital tax for a given labor tax abroad. This initial 
adjustment of the labor tax in each country is downward if the demand for public goods is 
relatively inflexible, or equivalently if , γ  defined as  is large enough.,) V ( / V - 2′′′ 11  Second, the 
two countries adjust their labor taxes in response to each other’s labor taxes until a new non-
cooperative labor tax equilibrium is reached. The pertinent reaction curves will be downward 
sloping, if the demand for public goods is sufficiently inflexible.12  For a large enough γ , the 
overall effect of higher capital income taxes on non-cooperative labor income taxes thus will be 
negative.  
To find the overall change in the common labor income tax, we can totally differentiate 
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(9) with respect to the two factor taxes where  with f0ˆ = nkε km = 0. Using the ‘bar’ notation to 
denote equal tax change in both countries, we find 
[ ] 0 =  d]    - 1 [  M+ d]   - 1 [ K  - d dd  - d  - mmcmkkckmm
n
m
mm
n
m ττεττεγττ
εττε  (8) 
where
m
c
m
k
c
k
d
dM 
M
1 - =  ,
d
dK 
K
1 - = τετε . Here, is the semi-elasticity of the employment of factor i 
in either country in response to a coordinated, common change in
 ciε 
 d iτ in both countries. 
 It is now useful to relate the factor employment semi-elasticities and to the 
conventional factor demand and supply semi-elasticities  and . To do so, we first note that 
a change in either tax affects the net factor rewards, w and r, as follows:
 niε  ciε
 dkε ε d m 
( ) 02 <+−= skdk
d
k
kd
dr
εε
ε
τ , 
( ) 02 <+−= smdm
d
m
md
dw
εε
ε
τ , 0== mk d
dr
d
dw
ττ . Now it is straightforward to see that the factor 
employment elasticities are given by    
 + 
 2) / (1 +   = s
i
d
i
d
i
s
id
i
n
i ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
εε
εεεε and  εε
εεε s
i
d
i
s
i
d
ic
i  + 
  = for i = k,m. Note 
that  if the underlying demand and supply elasticities are positive. This reflects that a factor 
tax increase in a single country induces a greater reduction in the employment of the affected 
factor in that country than a joint factor tax increase in both countries. 
c
i
n
i  εε >
From (8) we can explicitly solve for the common change in the labor tax resulting from 
the common capital tax increase as follows 
 
M
K  - = 
d
d
k
m θτ
τ  (9) 
 
with .
] M  - 1 [  + 
d
d   + 
] M   - 1 [  = 
m
c
m
m
n
m
m
n
m
k
c
k
τεγτ
ετε
τεγθ  The variable θ  is an ‘offset coefficient’ that indicates 
to what extent a coordinated increase in capital taxes is followed by a reduction in labor taxes. 
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Note that the offset coefficient can in principle be of either sign given that τ
ε
d
d
m
n
m can be of either 
sign. However, θ is positive if τ
ε
d
d
m
n
m is not too negative, which we take to be the normal case. In 
this normal case, labor taxes fall in response to a coordinated increase in capital taxes and. At the 
same time, the offset coefficient θ  then increases with the inflexibility of the demand for public 
goods as measured by γ. 
 The overall welfare implications of the capital tax coordination, as indicated, reflect the 
changes in both factor taxes. An increase in the common capital tax by itself affects welfare 
positively as [ ] K     V   = 
d
dW
k
c
k
k
)1('1 τετ −+− > 0 with , given (5). Similarly, an increase in 
the common labor tax by itself increases welfare as 
n
k
c
k εε <
[ ] M   V   = 
d
dW
m
c
m
m
)1('1 τετ −+− > 0 with 
, given (6). The welfare implications of a coordinated capital tax increase are hence in 
principle ambiguous in the normal case, where labor taxes are reduced. At the same time, welfare 
is more likely to decrease, the stronger is the negative response of labor taxes to the capital tax 
increase reflected in the offset coefficient 
n
m
c
m  εε <
θ . To see this, the overall change in welfare, W, can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
[ K  )    - 1 (  -   - 1  VK = 
d
dW
m
c
mk
c
k
k
τεθτεθτ ')1( +−− ] . (10) 
The first term in (10) represents the impact of overall tax changes on welfare as affected by factor 
supplies and consumption of the private good. This term is seen to be negative with incomplete 
offset, or θ < 1. The second term reflects the changed expenditure on public goods, given that 
[ ] K  )    - 1 ( -   - 1   = 
d
dG
m
c
mk
c
k
k
τεθτετ which is positive if τ
ετε
d
d
m
n
m
m
n
m + is positive (this follows from 
the expression for θ ).  Next, we find the following result:  
 
Proposition 1. 
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Assume that the supplies of capital and labor are flexible, but that the cross employment 
elasticities of capital and labor are zero. Then the welfare effect in either country of a coordinated 
increase in the tax on capital, including the induced change in the tax on labor, can be written as  
   
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡′ ε
εεθε
εε
τ n  m
c  
m
n  
m
n  
k
c  
k
n  
k
k
 -    -  -   ) 1 - V ( K = 
d
dW      (11) 
 
which has ambiguous sign. 
 
 For a proof, see the Appendix.  Expression (11) generally depends on the factor demand 
and supply elasticities as reflected in εkn and εkc and on the preferences for public goods as 
reflected in γ (which enters θ ). Some of these dependencies are clarified by 
 
Proposition 2 
i. If  γ = 0, then 0>
kd
dW
τ . 
ii. If  γ =∞ , then 
 0>
kd
dW
τ   if dm
s
m
d
k
s
k
ε
ε
ε
ε <  
iii.  If , then 0== mmmmmm fE
 a. 
kd
dW
τ   decreases in θ , 
 b. d
m
s
m
d
k
s
k
ε
ε
ε
ε <  is a sufficient condition for 0>
kd
dW
τ . 
 
For a proof, see the Appendix. Part i considers the case where V(G) is linear in the 
relevant range so that γ = 0 and also θ= 0. Then in (11) we see that τ kd / dW  > 0, as εkn > εkc. In 
this instance, the coordinated increase in τk is not followed by a change in and  are 
determined independently given that 
ττ km,  as τ m
V = ′λ  in (5) and (6). The capital tax increase thus is not 
offset by a subsequent reduction in the non-coordinated labor income tax. The coordinated 
increase in τk now is welfare enhancing, as the original non-coordinated value of τk is too low.  
Next, part ii takes the case where the demand for public goods is very inflexible. In the 
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extreme, we can take γ to be infinite so that τε
τεθ
m
c
m
k
c
k
   - 1
   - 1 = . This is the case where effectively the 
government has a fixed revenue requirement to finance an inflexible demand for public goods. 
The increase in τk is now followed by a reduction in τm so as to leave total tax revenues and the 
supply of the public good unchanged. This reshuffling of the tax mix enhances welfare, if at the 
margin the capital tax causes less dead-weight loss than the labor tax as seen from a system or 
world perspective. Formally, eq. (11) is now seen to imply   0 > 
d
dW
k
,τ if dm
s
m
d
k
s
k
ε
ε
ε
ε < and vice versa. 
Thus, a sufficient condition for the coordinated capital income tax to be welfare enhancing in this 
case is  If the elasticity of capital (labor) supply is zero (positive), so 
that the capital (labor) tax is non-distorting (distorting) at the world level, then the reshuffling of 
the tax mix towards the capital income tax will be welfare improving.  
.0,0, 0,0 >>>= dmdksmsk εεεε
More generally, the coordinated increase in the capital tax is more likely to be welfare 
increasing, the smaller  is relative to .At the same time, the partial coordination initiative is 
more likely to be welfare enhancing, the larger  is relative to , as a high capital demand 
elasticity leads to a low capital tax in the non-coordinated equilibrium. Increasing the capital 
income tax from a low level is relatively non-distorting. Note, however, that a relatively low 
capital tax, i.e. , is not a sufficient condition for a coordinated capital tax increase to be 
welfare enhancing.
ε sk ε sm
ε dk ε dm
ττ mk<
13  
Finally, part iii makes the additional assumptions that the third derivatives of the 
production function f w.r.t. M and the disutility function of labor E  w.r.t. M  are locally zero. For 
these additional assumptions, the employment elasticity  is invariant to a common change in 
labor tax rates. This implies that the offset coefficient 
ε nm
θ  is positively related to γ. In words, the 
coordinated capital tax increase causes countries to lower their labor taxes relatively much, if the 
demand for public goods is relatively inflexible (so that a reduction in public goods raises the 
marginal utility of these public goods relatively much). This works towards negative welfare 
implications of a coordinated capital tax increase, as a reduction in labor taxes by itself is welfare 
reducing. 
 
2.3 The case of fixed factor supplies and interdependent factor demands 
Next, we take the two factors to be in worldwide fixed supply, i.e. , but 0  =  0  = smsk εε  and
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now assume fkm >0 so that factor demands are interdependent. Again the two countries are 
assumed to collectively raise the capital income tax, τk, beyond the non-cooperative level in (6). 
Higher capital tax revenues continue to cause a reconsideration of labor tax policy. In response to 
the higher capital taxes, each country specifically wishes to adjust its labor tax downward for γ  
high enough.14 At the same time, reaction curves, that indicate how one country adjusts its labor 
tax in response to the other country’s labor tax, are downward sloping for high enough values of 
γ .15 Eq. (6) should hold in the new non-cooperative equilibrium in the two labor tax rates as well. 
Differentiating (6), we see that the changes in the coordinated capital income tax and the 
non-coordinated labor income tax are related as follows 
 
[ ] 0 = d K + d  M  - d MK  - d  - kmkn kmnm ττγτετε ˆ  (12) 
 
given that the factor employment elasticities  and are unaffected by symmetric tax changes 
for fixed factor supplies. We again wish to relate the factor employment elasticities   
and to the underlying factor demand elasticities   and . As a first step, we can 
establish that the net factor rewards, w and r, are related to the two factor taxes as follows: 
 nmε  n kεˆ
εε n mnk   , , εˆ nk
  n mεˆ εε d mdk   , , εˆ dk   dmεˆ
0 = 
d
dr = 
d
dw  ;
2
1 - = 
d
dw = 
d
dr
mkmk ττττ . It is now straightforward to see that the factor employment 
elasticities are related to the conventional factor demand elasticities as follows: 
εεεε ˆˆ, d in idini  2
1 =   
2
1 = , which are all positive with fkk fmm - (fkm)2 > 0.  
 From (12) we can solve for the change in the common labor tax following the 
coordinated increase in the capital tax as follows: 
 
M
K - = 
d
d
k
m 'θτ
τ  (13) 
 
with 
 M + 
 M +  = n
m
n 
k
γε
γεθ ˆ' > 0. 
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The offset coefficient θ ' in (13) is positive so that higher coordinated capital taxes are 
now surely followed by lower labor taxes. Once more we infer that the higher capital taxes by 
themselves imply higher welfare, while the lower labor taxes imply lower welfare. So in principle 
the welfare implications are again ambiguous. To proceed, we note that the changes in private and 
public goods following the overall tax changes are given by dC = - (1 -θ ’) K τd k , and dG = (1 - 
θ ’)K τd k . The impact on overall welfare, W, can now be stated as follows: 
 
Proposition 3. 
Assume that the supplies of capital and labor are fixed in both countries. Then the welfare 
effect in either country of a coordinated rise in the tax on capital, including the induced change in 
the tax on labor, is given by 
 
K  
 M + 
 -  1) - (V = K ) - (1 1) - (V = 
d
W d
n
m
n  
k
n
m
k
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡′′ γε
εεθτ
ˆ'  (14) 
 
which has ambiguous sign. 
 
From (14), we in fact see that the coordinated capital tax increase is welfare-improving, if 
 (or equivalently ), and vice versa. In (14), the expression for the welfare change 
is smaller (in absolute value), the larger is the parameter γ of the inflexibility of the demand for 
public goods. Specifically, the expression for 
εε ˆ n  knm  > εε ˆ d  kdm  > 
τd / dW k   in (14) approaches zero, as γ approaches 
infinity. This is the case where total tax revenues and the provision of public goods are not 
affected by the coordinated capital tax increase. The capital tax coordination just causes higher 
capital tax revenues to substitute exactly for lower labor tax revenues. Such a switch now does not 
affect welfare, as we take the capital and labor supplies to be inelastic.  
  To provide further insight, we next provide an example with a specific CES production 
structure which allows us to evaluate the demand elasticities εmd and , and thus also condition 
(14). In addition to the variable inputs K and  M, there is a fixed factor called L. The production 
technology takes the form of a nested CES structure. Inputs of capital, K, and the fixed factor, L, 
together produce the intermediate input I, while labor, M, and the intermediate input, I, together 
produce the final output, F. Formally, the production relationships are given by 
εˆ d k
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] ii
1- ρρL ) - (1 + K [ = I i --ρ ββ  (15) 
 ]M ) - (1 + I [ = F
1--- ρρρ αα  (16) 
 
where σi = 1/(1+ρi) and σ = 1/(1+ρ) are the constant elasticities of substitution. Further, let b be 
the share of total output paid in (gross) wages to workers. We can state our result in Proposition 3 
as follows for this nested CES production structure in 
 
Proposition 4. 
Assume that the production structure in either country is as given by eqns. (15) and (16), 
and that the supply of capital and labor is fixed. Then we have 
i) a coordinated increase in capital income taxes is welfare reducing, if σ < bσi , and vice 
versa, 
ii) a coordinated increase in the labor income taxes is always welfare improving. 
 
For a proof, see the Appendix. Thus, a coordinated increase in capital taxes is welfare 
decreasing for low substitution possibilities between M and I (low σ), high substitution 
possibilities between L and K ( high σi ), and a high factor share for M (high b). These 
considerations in part reflect under what circumstances the capital tax increase engenders a lower 
return to the fixed factor L, thereby increasing the implicit (non-distorting) taxation of the return 
to this factor. Clearly, unless σ = b σi, capital tax coordination (either an increase in or a reduction 
of taxes) is always potentially welfare improving. The proposition also makes clear that the exact 
specification of the production structure (here nested CES) affects the welfare implications of a 
coordinated capital income tax increase. To see this, reverse the positions of K and M in the 
production structure in formulas (15)-(16). In this instance, the results regarding the welfare 
properties of coordinated capital and labor tax increases in proposition 4 also switch. Specifically, 
a coordinated increase in capital income taxes is then always welfare improving, while the welfare 
results of a coordinated increase in labor income taxes are ambiguous. 
 
3. Simulation results 
 
  This section presents some estimates of the welfare effects of partial capital tax 
coordination obtained with the aid of a simple two-country simulation model. In several 
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respects, though, the simulation model is somewhat more complicated and realistic than the 
stylized theoretical model. First, the simulation model has two periods. Second, we make an 
effort to calibrate the model to EU-15 public finances statistics.  
  Welfare W in each country depends on consumption levels C1 and C2 in the two periods, 
on second-period leisure 'M - M  (with 'M  being a time endowment) and on second-period 
public goods G (see Table 2 for the selected iso-elastic welfare specification). In the first period, 
an endowment Y1 is divided between first-period consumption C1  and savings in the form of 
capital K.  The production function f(K, M) is taken to be Cobb-Douglas with kα and mα , kα + 
mα < 1, being the fixed shares of capital and labor income in total output.16 After second-period 
production, a share δ  of the capital is taken to be depreciated. The scrap value of capital,  (1-
δ)K, is available for second-period consumption along with the after-tax remuneration of 
domestic production factors. In the second period, consumers pay a lump sum tax of t. This tax 
is meant to represent exogenously given consumption taxes. The corresponding tax revenues, t, 
in addition to factor tax revenues, are available to finance public goods G. 
  Parameter values and calibration targets are summarized in Table 3. We assume that it 
takes a relatively long period of around 5 years for (labor) tax policies and public spending 
policies to reach a new international equilibrium following any capital tax coordination. Thus, 
we take the discount factor β to be 0.88, corresponding to a discount rate of 0.024 per annum (in 
this value for the annual discount rate and several other parameter values we follow Klein, 
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2005)). Similarly, we set the depreciation rate to 0.38, five times an 
annual depreciation rate of 0.076.  Next, the utility parameters ,σ  mσ and gσ  are chosen to be 
1.5, 2.0, and 2.0 respectively. Finally, the capital and labor shares in output are put to 0.30 and 
0.60, respectively. These values imply decreasing returns to scale in the variable inputs of 
capital and labor.  
  Remaining parameters in the model are selected so as to meet several calibration targets 
(see Panel B of Table 3). First, we target the gross rate of return r received by savers to 1.15, to 
reflect a net return per annum of about 0.03. Second, the fraction of time spent in work is 
calibrated to 0.40. Third, the share of public goods in total second-period consumption is set to 
0.21 (to mirror that general government final consumption expenditures in the EU15 in 2002 are 
21 percent of GDP). Fourth, exogenously given taxes t as a share of total second-period 
consumption are calibrated to 0.12 (to recognize that consumption taxes in the EU15 in 2002 are 
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12 percent of GDP).  
  The simulation model is too complex to yield explicit expressions for the factor 
employment elasticities ,  ,  , and . Therefore, we use an iterative simulation 
approach that computes these elasticities jointly with other variables.
n
kε nmε nkεˆ nmεˆ
17 Table 4 presents the main 
results. Column 1 first presents the outcome in the Nash equilibrium where the two countries set 
their capital and labor taxes independently. The ad valorem capital tax rate , shown in the 
table, is defined as 
kt
)1/( −+ rkk ττ , while the ad valorem labor tax rate is constructed as mt
)/( wmm +ττ . Migrating workers are likely to take into account taxes to be paid as well as 
employment-related benefits to be received in countries concerned.  Therefore, we take all factor 
taxes to be taxes  net of the corresponding benefits stemming from factor employment. Thus 
labor taxes represent labor taxes net of work-related benefits such as worker disability insurance, 
unemployment insurance and retirement benefits. This explains that we obtain a relatively low 
ad valorem labor tax rate of 0.135 in the Nash scenario. The corresponding share of capital 
income taxes in total factor taxes is calculated to be 0.360. This is somewhat higher than the 
actual capital share in factor tax revenues of 0.28 for the EU15 in 2002, reflecting that benefits 
related to factor employment accrue more to workers than to capital owners.  
 In our capital tax coordination experiment, the capital tax rate kτ  is raised by 0.0096 or 10 
percent of the Nash level of 0.096.  In columns (2) through (4) of Table 4, we in turn consider that 
government budget balance is reestablished by only a change in the labor tax mτ (for fixed G), by 
only a change in G (for fixed mτ ), or by changes in both mτ  and G. In column (2), the share of 
capital taxes in total taxes and also the share of public consumption in total consumption are 
raised. Welfare, however, is unchanged, which reveals that capital and labor taxes have similar 
excess burdens in the Nash equilibrium – not only from a national perspective but also from an 
international perspective. In column 3, we further see that welfare is raised relative to the Nash 
equilibrium. This confirms that capital income taxes are set too low in the Nash equilibrium. Next, 
in column 4 we see that mτ  and  fall relative to column 3. Thus the additional revenues from 
capital income taxation prompt countries to lower their labor tax rates in the new tax competition 
game.  As a result, welfare in column 4 is lower than in column 3. Welfare in column 4, however, 
remains higher than in column 1. This shows that with the particular magnitudes and elasticities 
we employ, the overall welfare effect of partial tax coordination – taking into account the 
mt
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adjustment in labor taxes - is positive. 
 Finally, in Table 5 we consider whether this main result is robust to changes in several 
parameter values. Thus we consider changes in σ  to either 1.2 or to 1.8, and changes in mσ or 
gσ to either 1.6 or to 2.4. For all of these alternative calibrations, we see qualitatively the same 
results as before. However, it is interesting to note that the fall-back in welfare from the 
adjustment in labor taxes - in column (3) relative to column (2) – is larger for gσ = 2.4 than for  
gσ = 1.6. This reflects that the downward adjustment is labor taxes is larger if the demand for 
public goods is relatively inflexible (corresponding to equation (9)).  
 Next, we set non-factor taxes t to zero to reflect that consumption taxes can be interpreted 
partly as indirect factor taxes. For this case, we interestingly find that welfare in column 4 exceeds 
welfare in column 3. The reason is that now capital tax coordination prompts countries to increase 
rather than reduce labor taxes in their subsequent labor tax competition – taking the relevant Nash 
equilibrium as a starting point. This possibility corresponds to the case where θ is negative in (9). 
Finally, Table 5 reports the case where capital tax coordination increases the capital tax kτ  by 
0.0048 or 50 percent from the Nash level. The welfare effects in the table are larger but similar to 
those before. In summary, we conclude that the result that partial tax coordination yields positive 
welfare effects is robust to a variety of changes in parameters and to the specifics of the capital tax 
coordination experiment.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the welfare implications of partial factor tax coordination in a 
world where two factors, capital and labor, are internationally mobile. A coordinated increase in, 
say, the capital tax may or may not be welfare improving, despite the fact that the non-cooperative 
capital tax is unambiguously below the optimal level. The reason is that countries will generally 
wish to alter other taxes, which are not subject to tax coordination, in a non-cooperative way, and 
this tax response may in itself deteriorate welfare. In particular, higher coordinated capital taxes 
generally lead to lower non-coordinated labor taxes. Such a shift in the tax mix is, however,  
welfare improving, if the capital tax is relatively less distorting from a system perspective and vice 
versa.  
Indeed, our analysis has revealed that in order to produce a positive welfare result, partial 
coordination of capital income taxes must avoid the scenario where (i) higher capital taxes barely 
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influence the provision of public goods, instead leading to a significant decrease in labor income 
taxes and (ii) labor taxes are less distortionary from a systems perspective than are capital taxes. 
At a theoretical level, we found that higher coordinated capital taxes tend to increase welfare, if 
the capital demand (supply) elasticity is large (small) enough relative to the labor demand (supply) 
elasticity for the case where the demand for public goods is very inflexible. In addition, we found 
that a coordinated capital tax increase may be welfare improving, if the elasticity of labor demand 
with respect to the gross wage exceeds the (cross) elasticity of capital demand with respect to the 
same gross wage.  
To gain further insight into the welfare effects of partial tax coordination, the paper also 
analyzed a two-country simulation model of capital and labor tax competition with factor 
mobility. The simulation model confirms that there is likely to be a downward adjustment in labor 
taxation following a joint increase in capital taxes as a result of international tax coordination. 
This induced reduction in labor taxation is in itself welfare-reducing. The simulation results, 
however, suggest that the overall welfare effects of capital tax coordination in the model are 
positive, when the model is calibrated to typical EU public finance data.  
Our results have been derived in models where two factors of production – capital and 
labor – are internationally mobile. It is natural to enquire in which way the results might change if 
the degree of labor mobility is less than perfect. We know from the work of Bucovetsky and 
Wilson (1991),18 that if countries have access to labor income and (source-based) capital income 
taxes, and labor (capital) is perfectly immobile (mobile) internationally, then there will be scope 
for coordinating national capital taxes, and a joint increase in these will be welfare-enhancing. 
Hence, the paradox of welfare-deteriorating partial capital tax coordination cannot occur without 
labor mobility. However, we conjecture that if labor is imperfectly mobile, but not perfectly 
immobile, then the possibility of the paradox re-emerges, presumably in such a way that the more 
mobile is labor, ceteris paribus, the higher is the chance of welfare-deteriorating partial tax 
coordination. A full examination of the impact of imperfect labor mobility requires an exact 
specification of the cause of imperfect mobility and is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Appendix 
 
Proof of proposition 1. 
Eq. (10) and τε mnk  VV '1' =− give 
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Substituting τε knk   for τε mnm   and rearranging yields 
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Next, we can substitute εετ nmnkk   /     for  τ m  from (5)-(6) and realize that ετ nkk    V = 1 - V ′′  
to yield (11). Ambiguity of this general expression is proved for the specific case of γ  equal to 
infinity in Proposition 2.ii. 
 
Proof of proposition 2. 
i. With  γ = 0, θ = 0. 
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a. This follows from (11) and the fact that θ is positively related to γ . 
b. This follows from combining the results under ii. and iii.a. 
 
Proof of proposition  4. 
The marginal productivity conditions can be written as  
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Log differentiation yields 
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 ) + (w  - F = M mτσ ˆˆˆ  
 
) + (r = K  - I ) - ( + F k-1i-1-1i-1 τσσσσ ˆˆˆˆ  
 
where the “^” notation stands for relative or percentage changes. 
Further, we have 
K a = I ˆˆ  
M b + I b) - (1 = F ˆˆˆ  
where a is the output elasticity of I w.r.t. K, and b is the output elasticity of F w.r.t. M. These 
elasticities correspond to factor shares due to constant returns to scale. 
We can now solve for  as follows M K ˆ andˆ
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From this, we can see that, for instance, the elasticity of K w.r.t. r, or
) + (r d
K d  -
kτ K
 + r kτ , 
is given by σi /(1-a). The semi-elasticity of K w.r.t. r or εkd , is then given by σi / [(1-a) (r+τk)], 
while the factor employment elasticity εkn is half of this, as εkn = ½ εkd .  In this manner, we can 
derive the four factor employment elasticities as follows 
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This together with an eq. analogous to (14) for a coordinated labor tax increase proves 
that such a coordinated tax increase always improves welfare, as in part ii of proposition 4. 
It can further be seen that  
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This shows that τk > 0 and τm  <> 0. At the same time, the condition for τm  > 0 is the same 
condition as the condition for a capital tax increase to be welfare improving in part i of 
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proposition 4. Thus in this instance a coordinated capital tax increase increases welfare in the 
ordinary case where the labor tax is positive. 
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Table 1. Taxes by economic function in the EU, 1995-2002  
 
 
A. As a percent of GDP 
 
 95 96 97  98 99 00 01 02 
 
Capital  7.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 9.0 9.2 8.8 8.3 
 
Labor  21.5 21.6 21.3 21.2 20.9 20.8 20.7 n.a. 
 
Consumption 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.6 11.9 11.8 11.6 11.6 
 
 
 
B. As a percent of total taxation 
 95 96 97  98 99 00 01 02 
  
 Capital  19.0 20.1 20.9 21.0 21.4 22.0 21.3 20.6 
 
 Labor 52.7 52.2 51.3 51.0 50.3 50.0 50.7 50.9 
 
 Consumption 28.2 27.8 27.8 28.0 28.3 28.0 28.0 28.6 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Table 2. Specification of the simulation model for the domestic economy 
 
Definition of welfare: 
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Production function: 
 
 mk MaKMKf αα=),(  
 
First-period resource constraint: 
 
1Y  =  + 1C K  
 
Second-period private budget constraint: 
 
  = f (K,M) -  (2C κτ+r ) K – ( )mw τ+  M  +  Kr  + w M  + ( 1-δ ) K - t   
 
Government budget constraint: 
  
  G =  κτ  K + mτ  M + t 
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Table 3. Calibration of the model 
 
A. Parameter values 
 
Discount rate    β    0.88 
Depreciation rate    δ    0.38 
Utility parameter    σ    1.50 
Utility parameter    mσ    2.00 
Utility parameter    gσ    2.00 
Capital share    kα    0.30 
Labor share    
m
α    0.60 
 
B. Calibration targets 
 
Rate of return    r    1.15 
Fraction of time worked   '   0.40 / MM
Share of public goods in second period G/ ( )GC +2   0.21 
 consumption 
Share of non-factor taxes in second )/( 2 GCt +   0.12 
 period consumption 
Note: The parameter values (apart from the labor share) and the calibration target for the 
fraction of time worked correspond to those in Klein, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2005, 
Tables 5 and 6) 
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Table 4. Simulation results 
     
      Nash  Capital tax coordination 
       G fixed, G variable, G and mτ  
            mτ  variable mτ  fixed both variable 
         (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
Simple factor taxes:  
   kτ      0.096  0.106  0.106  0.106 
  mτ      0.441  0.416  0.441  0.439 
Ad valorem factor taxes:  
       0.384  0.416  0.420  0.419 kt
             0.135  0.128  0.135  0.135 mt
Share of capital tax in total   0.360  0.394  0.382  0.383 
 factor taxes 
Share of public goods in total     0.214  0.214  0.218  0.218 
 second-period consumption 
Change in welfare      0  0.000  0.013  0.012 
 
Note. Capital tax coordination refers to a joint increase in the capital tax kτ  of  0.0096 (10 percent of the Nash level). Change in welfare is 
calculated as the equivalent proportional variation in all arguments in the welfare function relative to the Nash outcome. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis of welfare effects of capital tax coordination 
 
 
Change in parameter relative to  G fixed, G variable, G and mτ  
 Table 4    mτ variable mτ  fixed both variable 
 
       (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
σ  = 1.2     0.000  0.011  0.010 
σ  = 1.8     0.000  0.015  0.014 
mσ = 1.6     0.000  0.013  0.012 
mσ  = 2.4     0.000  0.013  0.012 
gσ = 1.6     0.000  0.013  0.012 
gσ = 2.4     0.000  0.013  0.011 
 t = 0     0.000  0.024  0.025 
048.0=∆ kτ     0.000  0.062  0.056 
 
Note. Capital tax coordination refers to a joint increase in the capital tax kτ  of  0.0096 (10 
percent of the Nash level in the base case) in all but the last case. The change in welfare is 
calculated as the equivalent proportional variation in all arguments in the welfare function 
relative to the relevant Nash outcome. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
∆
1 See, for instance, Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) for a discussion of recent corporate tax 
reform proposals in the EU. 
 
2 Comparable data for years before 1995 unfortunately do not exist. 
 
3 Kehoe (1989) shows that capital tax policy coordination may yield capital taxes that are too 
high if capital income tax policies suffer from time inconsistency. 
 
4 The welfare gains of higher capital income taxes under revenue neutrality may in part reflect that 
in Mendoza and Tesar (2005) higher capital income taxes also apply to previously accumulated 
capital. 
 
5 There generally can be a third, immobile and untaxed factor. 
 
6 There are no taxes on saving on the assumption that these are difficult to enforce in practice. 
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) have shown that there is a scope for international tax policy 
coordination in a world where the tax instrument set consists of a source-based capital income 
tax and a labor tax. 
 
7 In the two-country model, both countries are large enough to affect the net factor returns, w and r. 
In a different scenario, two small neighboring countries may have significant influences on each 
other’s labor markets, but they may together be too small to affect the worldwide net return to 
capital. In this instance, clearly labor taxes can be coordinated with unambiguously positive welfare 
implications for the two countries. 
8 We assume that the wage w is flexible in both countries. Alternatively, we could assume that 
the wage is rigid leading to unemployment. In this scenario, there may still be a role for a labor 
tax paid by employers in so far as the incidence of this tax is on profits rather than affecting the 
marginal employment of capital. In this scenario, there remains a trade-off between labor and 
capital taxation as affected by partial tax coordination. 
 
9 We assume that policy makers can commit to capital income taxes so that they take the capital 
supply response to taxation into account. In the absence of commitment, capital taxes would be 
determined for a given world capital stock  (with policy makers ignoring any capital supply 
response). Capital taxes chosen in this way could alternatively serve as a starting point to 
evaluate the welfare effects of partial tax coordination in section 2.1. 
 
10 In the Appendix,  is argued to be positive for the CES production structure in eqns. (15) and 
(16). 
11 Totally differentiating (6) we see that the partial effect of the common capital tax, τ k , on τm is 
found to be 
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which with γ going to infinity becomes 
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12 Totally differentiating (6) we see that the partial effect of τm* on τm is given by 
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With γ going to infinity, we get 
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13 To see this, we can check that  is equivalent to  from (5)-(6). This latter 
condition is equivalent to     
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with For high enough , we 
thus have even with  so that higher coordinated capital taxes are welfare 
reducing with a very inflexible demand for public goods or γ going to infinity. 
 
14 In fact, after differentiating (6) the partial effect of the common capital tax, τ k , on τm is now found 
to be 
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which is of ambiguous sign. Note that for γ large enough, τ
τ
k
m
d
d  is necessarily negative.  
 
In fact τ
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k
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d  approaches 
M
K -λ  as γ approaches infinity. 
 
15 After differentiating (6), we see that the partial effect of τm* on τm is now given by 
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 which is of ambiguous sign. For γ large enough, τ
τ
*
m
m
d
d  is negative. In fact τ
τ
*
m
m
d
d
k
 approaches 1 - λ < 
0 as γ goes to infinity.  
16 Unfortunately, there is little empirical basis for choosing any other production function at this 
level of abstraction. We acknowledge that our simulation results partly hinge on the choice of 
production structure. 
 
17 We first guess some values for the employment elasticities. Next, we simulate private and public 
sector activity given these elasticities. Then we calculate the employment elasticities implied by the 
model just simulated.  To do this, we consider a small increase in the capital tax τ  (by 0.0001) and 
resimulate private activity including capital and labor employment. The implied changes in factor 
employment are used to update our values of  and . Similarly, refitting the model for a slightly 
higher value of 
n
kε nmεˆ
mτ  yields updated values of  and . These updated values of the factor 
employment elasticities are subsequently used to recalculate the entire model (including public 
activity). This procedure continues until the factor employment elasticities have converged. For our 
base case, we find that the factor employment elasticities are about half the corresponding demand 
elasticities. Specifically, we find  = 0.512 ,  = 0.512 ,   = 0.458   and   = 
0.472 . 
n
mε nkεˆ
n
kε dkε nmε dmε nkεˆ dkεˆ nmεˆ
d
mεˆ
 
18 See their Proposition 2. 
